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From Silver Currency to the Gold Standard 
in the Philippine Islands 
Willern G. Wolters 
In 1903, the United States government introduced a gold standard mon- 
etary system in the Philippines, with a theoretical gold peso and a token 
silver peso in circulation. This currency reform was part of a wider 
American diplomatic offensive to expand the sphere of gold-based curreiz- 
cies in the world, in which American capital could be safely invested. The 
Philippine currency reform ended a period of monetary confusion in the 
islands during the late-nineteenth century. The circulation of silver 
commodity money had tied the Philippines to China, with cross-border 
flows of products and silver dollars. Under the gold standard, fund trade 
linkages were shifted to the United States. 
KEYWORDS: Philippine peso, currency reform, American administra- 
tion, British banks 
In 1903-1904, the new American colonial admmstration in the Phdip- 
pine islands undertook a drastic currency reform by introducing a gold 
standard monetary system in the country. This reform ended a period 
of monetary confusion, which had been caused by the worldwide de- 
cline in the gold value of silver during the last three decades of the 
nineteenth century. With the shift to the gold standard, the Phhppine is- 
lands joined the growing league of gold standard countries, which at 
the time comprised a number of European countries, the United States, 
Japan, India, and Siam. 
The P u p p i n e  currency reform was prompted by two different sets 
of considerations. The first set, most often discussed in contemporary 
publications, pertained to the local situation and contained a series of 
complaints about the monetary confusion in the islands caused by the 
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fact that silver-based coins and U.S. gold-based dollars circulated side 
by side among the population, with exchange rates that fluctuated in 
time. A second set of considerations played a role in the background. 
A few years earlier, the United States adopted the gold standard sys- 
tem, and the government in Washmgton, D.C., became an ardent advo- 
cate of the new monetary philosophy, eager to share its wisdom and 
experience with other countries in the world, particularly those in Asia 
and Latin America. 
To explain the advantages of the gold standard, we have to make a 
distinction between two types of money, viz., commodity and fiduciary 
money. Commodity money consists of objects whose value as a me- 
dium of exchange is s d a r  to the inws ic  value of the material from 
which they are made, mainly precious metals, silver, and gold. Fiduciary 
money consists of token coins and paper notes whose value is higher 
than that of the material from which they are made. The state has as- 
signed a value to these objects, and has forced their general acceptance 
as a medium of exchange within the state territory by demanding the 
use of only this currency in p a p g  taxes. This distinction has important 
consequences for the way the different monetary systems function. 
Commodity money can circulate across borders, as its intrinsic value 
commands its general acceptance. Fiduciary money is tied to the state 
which has issued it, and to the territory whose population functions as 
a "pay community." Under the gold standard, the state kept the gold 
supply in its treasury and issued fiduciary money, guaranteeing its value 
with these gold reserves. 
The gold standard had two functions, an internal and an external 
one. Domestically, it was a method of controhng the volume of the 
curreilcy, as the currency laws stipulated that the government could issue 
notes only if there was a sufficient backing of gold held in reserve. 
While this h t e d  the money supply, it gave a certain degree of flexibhty 
to the monetary system, as paper notes could be issued as a response 
to a growing demand for money in the business community, much 
faster than metakc coins could be manufactured. Internationally, the 
gold standard functioned as a method to preserve the stabdtty of ex- 
changes between currencies of gold standard countries. As each 
currency had its monetary unit expressed in a certain amount of gold, 
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the exchange rate between the currencies was fixed. The gold standard's 
main attraction was that it seemed to function automatically. If a coun- 
try encountered a balance of payment deficit, it had to pay its interna- 
tional debts by exporting gold. T h s  diminished the domestic reserves 
automatically, leading to a reduction of the domestic money supply. 
The gold standard thus created a stable payments system, resulting in 
the formation of global markets for such commo&ties as wheat and rice. 
The international function was the main reason why the United States 
urged other countries to adopt the gold standard. Between gold 
standard countries, capital could easily flow across borders. As the 
international price of silver in gold terms began to decrease continu- 
ously in the late 1870s, it was not advisable for capital owners in a 
gold standard country to invest capital in a silver-based country, as the 
investment would certainly lose its value over time. If that other coun- 
try would adopt the gold standard, investments could be made with 
much less risk. 
The last decades of the nineteenth century saw the rise of political 
and d t a r y  competition among the western states and a race to con- 
quer new colonies. An imperialistic and expansionistic mood emerged in 
the United States. The war with Spain in 1898, and the occupation of 
the Philippines and Cuba, resulted from this political ambition. Eco- 
nomic reasons formed the basis of this imperialistic policy, as the 
prominent American economist Charles Conant pointed out at the time 
(Conant 1900). The industrialtzed western countries in general, and the 
United States in particular, had accumulated large amounts of capital as 
savings, but for whtch there was not sufficient productive employment 
in the industrialtzed countries themselves. 'l'hese countries were facing a 
growing congestion of capital, leading to depressed profit margins. In 
Conant's (1900, 27) words: "the great industrial nations should turn to 
countries whtch have not felt the pulse of modern progress." The "sur- 
plus capital" should be invested in Asia and Latin America. But, first, 
these countries should be made safe for investment by persuadmg then1 
to accept the gold standard. 
In 1901-1904, the U.S. government sent missions of American 
economists to a number of countries in Asia and Latin America to 
urge the governments in these countries to adopt the gold standard as 
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the basis of a new global monetary and investment system (Rosenberg 
1999). As a member of these missions, Conant went to the Puppines  
in 1901 to devise a new Filipino gold exchange standard monetary 
system (Conant 1901). Conant's plan was turned into a law that was 
ratified by the U.S. Congress in 1903 and implemented in the P u p -  
pines in the same year. This plan became the model for s d a r  propos- 
als made to other countries, a diplomatic offensive which continued as 
"Dollar Diplomacy" into the 1920s (Parrini and Sklar 1983). T h ~ s  dip- 
lomatic activity clearly served the imperialistic intentions of the United 
States at the time. By persuading other countries, and particularly China, 
to adopt the gold standard, the U.S. intended to create a gold-backed 
dollar bloc, to which American investments could be safely channeled. 
The Silver Currencies in Asia 
From about 1877 to 1903, the P u p p i n e  islands were part of a larger 
monetary world dominated by silver currencies, which also encom- 
passed the Chinese coastal areas and parts of its hmterland, the British 
colony Hong Kong, French Indochma, Singapore and the Straits Settle- 
ments, British Borneo and Labuan, and the islands of Sumatra and 
Borneo of the Netherlands Indles. Although Asia hardly produced silver 
itself, its monetary systems were all based on the use of silver coins. 
This silver had been supplied from the Americas on a large scale, since 
the European states had established d t a r y  and trade links between the 
old world and the new world. Even China, which hardly found any 
silver in its mines, had a monetary system based on silver. 
This large area in Asia became an export-oriented cash-crop region, 
supplying agricultural commodities to Europe and the United States. 
Western tradmg houses had offices at the main ports and conducted a 
lively trade in import goods and export products. Western banks had 
offices in the main port-cities along the Chinese coast and in other 
capitals as well, primarily as exchange banks. W i t h  this region, there 
was a significant movement of people, money, and goods. 
The trading of goods, both with the rest of the world and within 
the region, was based on an elaborate system of western merchant 
firms, western banks, Chinese merchant fil-ms and native banks, ship- 
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ping companies, insurance firms, and the ltke. In this silver currency 
area, money could more or less flow freely from one country to the 
next, either in the form of cash shipped from one point to another by 
couriers, or in the form of b a s  of exchange and money orders, sent 
from one bank to another. The largest part of these flows was done 
as payment for goods and to settle accounts, but there was also a flow 
of money from one country to another to f a  up currency deficits. 
The Asian silver currencies could be considered as commodity 
money, whereby the value of the coin was determined by its intrinsic 
metahc value. The coins circulating in the East and Southeast Asian 
Regions during the second half of the nineteenth century had a very 
similar silver content, slightly differing from the Mexican standard. 
These coins were all called dollar, a corruption of the Austrian word 
thahr, after the valley Joachunsthal, where Austrian silver was mined. 
The oldest silver coins circulating widely in Asia were Spanish- 
American coins, minted in Mexico during the seventeenth and eigh- 
teenth centuries (see figure 1). These dollars were minted for wide 
circulation (almost half a biUton were coined) and were exported all 
over the world, including Asia, and were accepted as commodity 
money in many markets. After Mexico freed itself from Spanish rule in 
1821, coins with the same silver content as their predecessors were 
struck at the mint, but with the legends "Republica Mexicana" and 
"Libertad." These Mexican dollars were minted in even larger numbers 
(about 1,466 million were coined between 1821 and 1903) and ac- 
quired a wide circulation. They invaded the Phrlippines in the 1820s, and 
Chtna probably at around the same time (Legarda 1976, 163). By 1870, 
the coin was current not only in the two American continents, in the 
West Indies, and in the islands of the Pacific and Japan, but throughout 
large parts of Asia (Andrew 1904). The Mexican dollar attained its 
widest circulation in Chma, where an estimated 400-500 d o n  dollars 
were used in the beginning of the twentieth century (Andrew 1904; 
Perez 1954; Ganzon de Legarda 1976). Between the 1860s and 1903, 
western countries striving to extend their sphere of influence in Asia 
brought their own silver dollars into circulation. 
From the mid-1870s unul the end of the nineteenth century, this 
extensive silver region in Asia felt the negative effects of the worldwide 
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Source: King 1987 (vol. I), p. 274, Table 8.2; p. 308, Table 9.3; p. 401, Table 12.1; p. 454, 
Table 13.1; 1988 (vol. 2), p. 42, Table 1.3. 
Figure 2. Average price o f  silver in London, in pence per ounce, 1872-1910 
would determine its intrinsic value, money substitutes were not easily 
accepted. The system did not allow the use of paper money on a sig- 
nificant scale. In Asia, the big commercial banks issued bank notes, 
whlch circulated among their clients in the business community. Checks 
and bas  of exchange could circulate among merchants, but also on a 
small scale and in h t e d  circles. The name and the reputation of the 
commercial institutions guaranteed that this paper would ultimately be 
redeemed. But the system had no room for government issuance of 
paper money on a larger scale-suggesting that a system based on metalkc 
money was inherently inflexible. Because the cost of producing metallic 
money was high, the amount of money in circulation could not be easily 
adjusted to the seasonal fluctuation of money (Conant 1905, 11, 128). 
Another disadvantage was that huge amounts of silver money could 
suddenly flow out of or into the country, disturbing prices and causing 
economic problems. These flows could be caused by political events 
elsewhere, such as war in China, or by economic events, such as har- 
vest failure, necessitating large-scale importations of rice to be paid with 
silver money. There were practical problems as well. Large payments 
required the transportation of heavy loads of silver coins from one 
place to another, with the necessary costs of packing, shipping, 
handhg, brokerage, and insurance. Another source of transaction costs 
was the exchange of money. In multiple currency systems, coins had to 
be constantly converted into each other, requiring the intermediation of 
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large numbers of moneychangers. Converting coins was an elaborate 
ritual as the moneychangers had to weigh the coins and test their purity. 
The decltne in the gold value of silver was another cause of difficul- 
ties. In around 1900, many people in the business communities in Asia 
were convinced that the decltne of silver was actually an advantage as 
exports from Asia became cheaper and therefore larger in volume. In 
turn, importers feared that prices of goods from gold-based countries 
would increase. The American economist and banker Conant (1905) 
already expressed h s  doubts about ths  relationshp. Later research has 
shown that the correlation does not hold. After the shft to gold, ex- 
ports actually increased (van der Eng 1999, 75-78). The main problem 
for the business community seemed to be that exchange rate instabhty 
made business unpredictable. 
The Currency System in the Philippines 
from the 1850s to 1903 
The transformation of the Phhppine economy into an agricultural ex- 
port economy was brought about by the financial stimulus of foreign 
merchant houses, as economic hstorian Legarda (1999) has pointed out. 
These firms, owned by British, American, and German entrepreneurs, 
were engaged in purchasing agricultural produce (sugar, Manila hemp, 
tobacco) from Philippine producers and in distributing imported goods. 
Mddlemen managed the marketing channels between M a d a  and the 
provinces. Before the 1860s, middlemen in the import-export domain 
were mostly Chinese mestizos, but when immigration laws were relaxed 
after the 1850s, ethnic Chinese took over. Between the 1860s and the 
1880s, the merchant houses provided loans to middlemen and produc- 
ers, and extended liberal credit facilities to distributors of imported 
goods. From about 1860 to the end of the Spanish regime, the 
Phhppines functioned as a cash-crop economy, tied to foreign markets, 
and at the same time as an outlet of western consumer products. This 
growing commercial economy needed an enlarged monetary system 
and modern business practices. 
In order to improve the inadequate monetary situation in the islands, 
the Spanish colonial government established a mint in 1861 and started 
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to produce coins. Initially, the currency system was on the double stan- 
dard of gold and silver. The mint in Manila produced gold coins of 
four, two, and one peso, and silver coins of fractional value. Between 
1861 and 1885, the mint produced gold coins at a value of 18.5 mil- 
lion pesos, and silver coins at a value of 6.4 d o n  pesos. Unul 1876- 
77, the exchange rate of gold and silver in the Philippines was stable. 
However, in 1876, the adoption of the gold exchange standard in a 
number of countries made itself felt and the resulting decline in the 
international gold-value of silver started to undermine the system of 
stable exchange. 
Remarkably, the Spanish colonial government in the Puppines did 
not notice this phenomenon unul it was too late. In 1876, it issued a 
decree stating that the circulation of Mexican dollars in the islands was 
legal and that the Phihppine gold peso and the Mexican silver peso 
were at par. This opened the possibility for traders to exchange 
cheaper silver dollars for more expensive gold coins. They imported 
large amounts of Mexican dollars and bought Phrlippine gold at the 
official parity rate. These gold coins were shpped out of the country 
and melted, a classic example of Gresham's law that bad money drives 
out good money. In 1877, the disappearance of gold coins from the 
islands became noticeable and the government quickly tried to rem- 
edy the situation. A decree was issued, prohibiting the importation of 
Mexican silver coins, but stating that Mexican silver already in the coun- 
try, and coined in 1877 or before, would continue to be received as 
legal money in the country. However, the outflow of gold could not 
be stopped. By 1884, gold coins had entirely disappeared from circu- 
lation. The mint ceased producing gold coins. Close to 20 d o n  gold 
pesos had been replaced by the same amount in Mexican silver dollars. 
The country was de facto no longer on a gold standard. 
Although the 1877 prohibition on the importation of Mexican dol- 
lars was not strictly implemented, it did create a money scarcity in the 
Phihppine islands. The effect was that silver coins in Manila had a 
higher value than the buhon content of the coins, in other words, they 
had a "scarcity value," so that in fact, as the American economist 
Kemrnerer (1916, 250-52) observed, the monetary system was not based 
on a pure silver standard, but on a fiduciary standard. 
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This fiduciary standard shows from the fact that, for most of the 
years between the 1870s and the early 1900s, silver coins had a hlgher 
value in Manila than in Hong Kong. The Dutch civil servant Wiselius 
(1876), who traveled to the Phhppine islands in 1875, mentioned this 
exchange difference between Hong Kong and Manila. Wiselius (1876, 
108) had been advised in Hong Kong not to bring paper money or 
gold coins to Manila, but only silver, and he notes that this earned htm 
a profit of 5 percent in a few days. The difference in value between 
the two places was in the order of 8 to 12 percent in the 1880s, and 
of 25 percent in 1894 (Foreman 1980, 260). 
One effect of this artificial money scarcity in Manila, and conse- 
quently the higher value of the coins, was the smuggling of Mexican 
dollars from Hong Kong to the Philippine islands. Foreman (1980, 
260) estimated that, in 1887, the clandestine import of Mexican dollars 
averaged 150,000 pesos per month. Harden (1898, 6) wrote, "The 
smuggling of silver into the islands was a recopzed industry. It was 
carried on largely by the rich 'mestizos,' or Chinese half-castes. There 
was a regular system for the bringing in of these coins, which would 
be shipped from Hong I<ong in a special steamer and the cargo 
would be landed at some point north or south of Manila Bay." 
As the currency was inelastic, an outside money source had to func- 
tion as a reserve and an overflow area. The Hong Kong-Amoy region 
could fulfill these functions for the Philippine islands because both 
regions used the Mexican dollar as standard currency. Moreover, 
exchange was easy, since there were numerous links between the 
Philippines and these port cities. The two countries formed as if they 
were a set of communicating vessels, in which money could flow back 
and forth, in reaction to the demand for currency. 
Figure 3 shows the semi-yearly fluctuations in exchange rate on Lon- 
don and the average bullion value of the Mexican peso in gold terms, 
both quoted in terms of the number of English pence to the peso.' 
In Manila, the exchange rate on London was systematically higher than 
the bullion value of the Mexican dollar, and also higher than the ex- 
change rate in Hong Kong, all measured in sterhg terms. In Mexican 
silver terms, the situation was the reverse: the exchange rate on London 
was cheaper in Manila than in Hong Kong because the silver dollar was 
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more valuable in Manila than in Hong Kong (Kemmerer 1905, 23; 1916, 
250-61). In other words, bas of exchange on London were cheaper in 
Manila than in Hong Kong, so that "it was more advantageous to 
get exchange on London from Manila than from Hongk~ng."~ 
+Average value of Meldcan dollar in sterling (perm) (bullion value) 
-Sterling rates in Manila (fw months' bankpaper) (exchange value) 
Figure 3. Semi-yearly variations in exchange rate and bulhon values of the Mexican 
peso in Manila. 
The total amount of money circulating in the Philippine isIands was 
relatively small for the size of the export economy. During the 1890s, 
circulation was estimated at 30 to 35 million silver pesos, consisting of 
about 10 million Spanish-Filipino fractionary silver coins, about 20-25 
d o n  Mexican dollars, and about 2-3 million in bank notes issued by 
the Banco Espaiiol-Filipino (Camara de Comercio 1895; Foreman 
1980, 635; Kemmerer 1916, 249-50). In 1897, the Spanish government 
imported 6 d o n  Spanish-F~lipino pesos, the so-called "Alfonsinos" 
(see figure 4). One Spanish author estimated the amount of money 
circulating in the provinces at not more than 12 d o n ,  so that most 
of the money circulated in Manila, part of which consisted of bank 
notes and checks from the British banks (Feced 1894, 273). 
The question arises on the extent to whlch the Fhpino population 
was affected by the currency fluctuations. The answer is: not very 
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Exporters were believed to benefit from the decline of silver, as 
they purchased their products in the Philippines with cheap silver, and 
received payment in gold from gold exchange countries, such as Great 
Britain and the United States. The foreign traders community in Manila 
and the officials of foreign banks were in favor of the silver standard 
system and the use of Mexican dollars. 
Spanish observers and commentators writing about the monetary 
situation did so primarily from the point of view of the Spanish com- 
munity. They despised the fact that the islands were flooded with 
Mexican dollars, and they often attributed the decline in silver price to 
the use of what they considered as bad and fraudulent coins. They 
compared the situation unfavorably with the one in Spain. The Spanish 
commentator and advisor Francisco Godinez wrote that purchasing one 
pound s t e r h g  would cost 10 Mexican silver coins in Chma, 8 silver 
coins in the Phihppines, and -5 equivalent silver coins of 25 grams in 
Spain (Godinez 1894a, 9). The Spaniards looked with suspicion at the 
Chinese traders who brought the Mexican dollars to the Philippines. 
Godmez (1894a, 9) pointed out that the price difference between Chma 
and Manila of bills of exchange on Europe, in the order of 10 to 
15 percent, drew Mexican pesos to the archipelago. A profit of this 
h d ,  to be made in less than eight days (the time needed to make the 
roundtrip from Hong Kong to Manila), presented a strong incentive 
which could not be resisted. 
While most observers agreed that the currency situation in the 
Philippines was unfortunate, at least for the Spanish administration and 
for the Spanish community, there were different views on how to 
remedy the situation. They agreed with the principle that the Mexican 
silver dollar, controlled by outside forces, had to be driven out of the 
Philippine economic system, and that the means to achieve this would 
be to impose stricter border controls. 
Three options for a fundamental currency reform were discussed, 
viz., (1) the introduction of a gold-based currency system; (2) the use 
of the bimetalhc (gold and silver) currency of motherland Spain; and 
(3) the coinage of a silver coin especially for the Phhppine islands 
(Godinez 1894a, 14-21). 
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The first option was heady discussed in the Spanish press. A number 
of authors favored a switch to gold, in the form of a gold standard 
system, in whch the gold fund would be kept in the treasury and the 
silver token coins would be supplemented with bank notes to be is- 
sued by the Banco Espaiiol-Filtpino. Others, hke Godinez, rejected ths  
solution because they thought this would be an unbearable burden for 
the treasury of the colony. 
The second solution, the use of the bimetahc currency of Spain, was 
attractive to the eyes of many Spaniards both in the islands and in 
Madrid because it would create a monetary identity between the moth- 
erland and the colony, and promote economic integration between 
them. Godmez (1894a, 1894b) strongly favored this option. The third 
option was given less attention because it was feared that the silver 
coins from the islands would disappear from circulation and be ex- 
ported to neighboring countries. 
In 1895, an advisory commission of the Ministry of Colonies in 
Madrid chose the first option, with the support of the M a d a  Cham- 
ber of Commerce. The plan was to dnve out the Mexican dollar and 
to shft to a gold standard system (Cimara 1895). The plan was never 
carried out in its entirety, but the Spanish government undertook the 
initial preparatory steps. In 1897, the government in Madrid ordered the 
minting of a Spanish-Filipino peso, bearing the bust of the young 
King Alfonso XIII, and therefore called "Alfonsinos,'' with a pure silver 
content lower than that of the Mexican peso (Ganzon de Legarda 
1976, 44). More than six d o n  coins were minted and shipped to the 
islands, but these well-designed coins &d not succeed in dnving out the 
Mexican dollars. The lower silver content and the small number limited 
their acceptabhty to replace the Mexican silver in circulation (Ganzon 
de Legarda 1976, 44-45). 
In 1896, the Philippine Revolution started, coincidmg with the revo- 
lution in Cuba, and soon the Spanish government was confronted with 
skyrocketing expenses for the war operations, which precluded all 
reforms. Between October 1896 and June 1897, the costs of the 
insurrection amounted to more than 38 d o n  pesos (Gastos de la 
Insurrecci6n 1897). In 1898, Spain lost its colony to the United States. 
WOLTERS I GOLD STANDARD 389 
American Administrators, British Banks, 
and Mexican Coins (1898-1903) 
The arrival of American troops on the Philippine islands in 1898 and 
1899 increased the degree of chaos and confusion in the monetary 
system. Immediately after the Spanish forces surrendered, the U.S. d- 
tary commander allowed the local banks to freely import Mexican 
dollars in order to ease the monetary situation. With this decision, the 
Phrlippines passed from the fiduciary coin standard, in whch the Mexi- 
can dollar had a higher scarcity value, to a silver standard with the 
Mexican dollar as the unit of value. 
The monetary situation during the first few years of the American 
colonial regme was complicated by the fact that a silver and a gold sys- 
tem coexisted in the islands. The American administration brought large 
amounts of U.S. dollars into the Phhppine islands as payment for army 
and navy and for government expenditures. The effect was that two 
kinds of "dollars" circulated side by side, yet the U.S. dollar was on a 
gold standard and the Mexican dollar on a silver standard. Although 
the U.S. dollar was made of silver and contained less silver than the 
Mexican dollar, in the United States, where it was legal tender, the U.S. 
dollar had twice the value of the Mexican because it could be ex- 
changed at par with gold-based currency. However, this gold value was 
not automatically maintained outside the U.S. territory. There, its value 
was to be seen based on the price the market would assign to U.S. 
dollars. The American admulistration in the islands tried to maintain a 
fsed exchange rate between the two currencies, at the rate of one U.S. 
dollar against two Mexican dollars. It negotiated with the foreign banks 
in an attempt to freeze the exchange rate via an agreement. However, 
to the amazement of the Americans, the exchange rate could not be 
fured and fluctuated heavily between 1.80 and 2.66 Mexicans to the 
U.S. dollar. 
During these years, the American administration in the PhLLippines 
clashed with the British commercial banks in the islands over payment 
problems and currency management. In 1898, there were four banks in 
the islands, two Spanish and two British. One of the Spanish banks, 
the Banco Espaiiol-Fhpino (established in 1852), had the right to issue 
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bank notes, of which about 2.4 d o n  were in circulation. The other 
one, the Monte de Piedad (established in 1882), was a small savings 
and loan bank. The two British banks, the Hong I<ong and Shanghai 
Bankmg Corporation (branch opened in 1876) and the Chartered Bank 
of India, Australia and Chma (branch opened in 1873), were exchange 
banks, financing the trade in import and export products and handling 
bills of exchange on foreign countries. The Hong I<ong Bank had its 
head office in Hong I<ong, and the Chartered Bank in Shanghai. 
The coexistence of gold-based U.S. dollars and Mexican silver dol- 
lars was bound to create confusion and a fluctuating exchange rate be- 
tween the two currencies. O n  19 August 1898, the two British banks 
and the Spanish-Fhpino bank wrote a letter to the U.S. commanding 
officer, stating that, 
. . . while we are anxious to give the solders and your Government 
every assistance by being in a position to quote an exchange of not 
worse than $2 Mexican for $1 gold, we shall be quite unable to 
preserve this basis of exchange should there be any scarcity. 
In view of this, the banks requested the freedom to import Mexican 
dollars duty free. If that request would be granted, they added, "we 
agree to maintain a rate of exchange of not less than two Mexican 
dollars for one gold to the extant of our imports of Mexican dollars" 
(Reporzt 1900, 101). 
An agreement was concluded between the American administration 
and the banks, whereby it was understood that the two banks would 
assist the a h s t r a t i o n  in maintaining the exchange rate of two to one 
between the U.S. dollar and the peso, and that the banks were allowed 
to import Mexican dollars legally in an u n h t e d  amount. The banks 
would supply Mexican dollars to the troops for "gold," and would 
import Mexican dollars equal to the amount of gold purchased. How- 
ever, the agreement failed to bring the desired stabhty in the exchange 
rate. 
There were more irritations. In 1899, the two British banks lobbied 
the American government to be designated as official depositories of 
the U.S. treasury funds in the islands. Tlus request was granted, and in 
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August 1899 the two banks were appointed as official depositories of 
U.S. government funds. However, the banks only accepted deposits 
from the government, not from individuals. An American soldier wish- 
ing to deposit hts pay with the bank had to sell his U.S. currency to the 
bank in exchange for local or  silver currency. And the other way 
around, if he wanted to send money back home, he had to purchase 
U.S. dollars from the bank, and for thts exchange the bank charged a 
commission. 
In May 1899, the Chief Paymaster of the army wrote to headquarters: 
The two English banks seem to be in collusion, and charge exorbi- 
tantly for all business transactions over their counters. When an 
officer or enlisted man goes to deposit his gold with them it is 
credited to his account in silver, at the current rate-for this is a 
silver country-and if he wants gold for any purpose they never 
charge him less than 5 per cent for it. I have noticed that when 
pay day approaches, the banks put down the rate for gold, so that 
they can make a greater profit from the solhers. (Edwards 1900, 8) 
I n  the second half of 1900, a fierce exchange of arguments took 
place. O n  3 August, General MacArthur (the father of the Pacific War 
hero) reported by telegram from Manila that the exchange rate of the 
U.S. dollar was dropping rapidly: 
Remote cause of fluctuations is Chinese war, which is made pretext 
by local banks for profitable speculation in United States currency. 
As a temporary restraint on downward movement have ordered 
United States currency tendered in payment of customs to be re- 
ceived as heretofore at the rate of two for one. (Edwards 1900, 45) 
The Secretary of the Treasury in Washgton ,  D.C., L. J. Gage, re- 
sponded with strong words on 10 August: 
General MacArthur seems to think that the hlgher price of Mexicans 
at the bank is due to the perversity and greed of the bank, but it 
finds its excuse in the disturbance in the movement of money 
caused by the Chinese troubles. I am more inclined to believe that 
the banks are giving no new exhibition of sordidness, but that they 
392 PHILIPPINE STUDIES 51. no. 3 (2003) 
themselves are the necessary victims of the unfavorable influences 
occasioned by the Chinese war. They are obliged to adjust them- 
selves and their actions to the influence of movements they cannot 
control, and I do not see why General MacArthur is not subject to 
the same rule of cornmerclal necessity. (Edwards 1900, 46-47). 
The agent of the Chartered Bank in Washington, D.C., G. Bruce- 
Webster, wrote in a memorandum to the War Department in October 
1900: 
Much has been said and written against the action of the banks 
in Manila, in converting the gold coin brought to it into local 
Philippine currency. It has not been understood seemingly that the 
legal tender in the Islands has not been changed by the transfer of 
ownership and that so far as the banks are concerned and oth- 
ers interested in large money transactions, the United States money 
cannot legally be tendered by them in settlement of accounts, and 
must, therefore, be treated as bullion and be liable to fluctuating 
local prices as such. For this reason, it is an error to think that the 
local price of U.S. currency indicates or affects its popularity mea- 
sured in sentiment, whereas it merely expresses its udty,  measured 
in the local standard of value, the peso.' 
In short, the Americans found that in an Asian country, U.S. currency 
could not be handled at par; it was worth less than at home. They also 
found that Asian legal tender silver coins were subject to the laws of 
supply and demand, and that their value fluctuated not only according 
to market forces, but also to the vagaries of political development in 
China and other Asian countries. 
I n  spite of the fact that liberal circles in Washington, D.C., ex- 
pressed sympathy for the point of view of the private banks, the 
Phdtppine Commission in Manila took steps to regulate the banks. In 
November 1900, the Commission regarded the banks' business practice 
of not accepting private deposits of U.S. dollars "as a discrimination 
against money of the United States," and passed an ordinance requiring 
the banks to accept deposits both in the currency of the United States 
and in Mexican or  local currency, and to repay such deposits by checks 
or  otherwise in the h d  of money from which they were made, that 
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is, silver for silver and gold for gold. Although representatives of the 
two British banks lobbied the politicians to change the policy, the or&- 
nance remained in force until the adoptlon of the gold standard. This 
measure stabilized the exchange rate in 1901 and 1902. In 1902, two 
American banks opened branches in Mada ,  and the government trans- 
ferred a large part of its funds to these new banks. In subsequent 
years, the British banks were subject to closer control than they were 
used to in Hong I<ong. 
Import and Export of Mexican Dollars 
International political factors had an impact on the P u p p i n e  situation. 
The exchange rate between Mexican and American dollars fluctuated 
because, internationally, the demand for Mexican dollars fluctuated 
widely. The U.S. d t a r y  administration granted the two British banks 
permission to  import silver Mexican dollars legally in an unlimited 
amount. It was estimated that between August 1898 and August 1900, 
the two banks imported about 12 d o n  Mexican pesos into the is-- 
lands. Then the direction of the flow was reversed. Between August 
and November 1900, at least 3 rnilhon Mexican dollars, and probably 
several d o n s  more, disappeared from circulation in the islands and 
were apparently exported to China (Report 1901). This outflow was 
caused by a large demand for Mesican dollars in northern China, 
where western military forces were carrying out military operations 
around Beijing to crush the Boxer uprising. The outflow of Mexican 
dollars from the Phrlippines was so large that, for some time, Manila 
was reportedly devoid of currency. 
The American officials found to their chagrin that most of the U.S. 
currency that Americans had spent in the Phrlippine islands &sappeared 
from circulation. Only a small amount returned to the treasuries of the 
American bureaus. Between August 1898 and June 1901, almost 24 
d o n  U.S. dollars were paid out to the troops, and very little was re- 
turned to the U.S. g~ve rnmen t .~  
An exceptionally large inflow of about 20 d o n  Mexican dollars 
took place in 1902-1903. The Chmese government required gold-based 
currency to settle indemnity obligations to western states, and came to 
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the P u p p i n e  market with its Mexican silver to purchase U.S. dollars, 
which had been brought into circulation through payments of  army 
and navy officers and men. As a result of this silver inflow, the ex- 
change rate between the U.S. and the Mexican dollar went up to 2.60 
Mexicans. As the American Collector of Customs reported (1904): 
. . . the volume of Mexican silver became so great in Manila that 
the banks gave notice that they would no longer receive it on de- 
posit from their customers, and for a time it was necessary to store 
the same under counters and in out-of-the-way places in boxes and 
sacks about the business houses, much in the same manner as a 
merchant would store salt or nails.' 
Between March and November 1903, more than 15 d o n  Mexi- 
cans were exported from the islands. Several factors were mentioned at 
the time. One was that the government of Siam was changing its 
monetary system from silver standard to gold, and it was expected that 
Mexican dollars would be redeemed at a higher price than they had 
been elsewhere. The prospect of big profits stimulated traders to hur- 
riedly import Mexicans into Siam. Another factor was that large 
amounts of silver currency had been paid for substantial rice importa- 
tions from Indochina, as the rice harvest in the Philippines failed that 
year because of excessive drought. However, thts outflow of Mexican 
coins did not create a shortage of currency at the time, since the 
American administration had just started introducing the new PMppine 
currency. In fact, the export of Mexicans facilitated the shift to the 
gold standard s y ~ t e m . ~  
Views of the Foreign Business Community 
in Manila on Currency Reforms 
The community of foreign traders and bankers in M a d a  strongly pre- 
ferred the silver-based currency system to a gold-based one. That be- 
came clear during the hearings whch the Phhppine Commission, the 
provisionary American governing board in the islands, held with prorn- 
nent persons in the new colony in 1899. Almost all of the foreign 
business people, including a Spanish banker, expressed a strong prefer- 
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ence for the continuation of the silver standard and rejected the idea 
of a shift to the gold standard. They often used strong words. When 
asked about his opinion about a shift to a gold basis, the British 
businessman John T. McCleod answered: "I think it would be a 
great mistake" (Report 1900, 306). The British trader Barnes stated: 
"This is a producing country, and I believe the silver basis is the best" 
(Report 1900, 185). The director of the Banco Espafiol-Filipino, the 
Spaniard Balbas, remarked about a possible switch to the gold dollar: 
"Well, it would be disastrous to the country, I think" (Report 1900, 
155). Of the eight foreign businessmen interviewed by the Commission, 
seven were in favor of retaining the silver-based system. 
An important domestic consideration for most of these experts was 
that the switch would affect prices. They thought that the silver dollar 
would be replaced right away by a gold dollar (having twice the value 
of the silver), and that the indigenous population would continue to ask 
for full payment in dollars, regardless of the official value, thereby rais- 
ing prices. An additional argument was that gold dollars would be "too 
big" for day-to-day transactions, and that gold currency would there- 
fore circulate much more slowly than silver coins. Most of the experts 
expressed fear that the wages and payments for agricultural products 
would go up, and that Philippine export products would no longer be 
competitive in the world market. The businessmen agreed that it would 
be advisable to replace the Mexican dollar with an American-Fhpino 
silver peso of the same value. 
The only expert interviewed by the Commission who was in favor 
of a gold-based currency system was the Filipino businessman Legarda, 
who stated: "The opinion of the majority of Filipinos is that we 
should have a gold basis" (Reporst 1900, 176). Legarda did not expect a 
doubling of  prices because "people would simply pay one-half of 
what they pay now in dollars." 
In 1902, the New York agent of the Hong I<ong and Shanghai 
Bank, the British businessman Townsend, was heard before a commit- 
tee of the U.S. Senate in Washmgton, D.C. In a written statement and 
in the interview, Townsend took a strong stand against the introduction 
of the U.S. dollar or a gold-based system in the Philippines, and ex- 
pressed his preference for an American-coined silver dollar as the ba- 
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fine, as the unit of value. This unit was equivalent to one-half of U.S. 
dollar. For actual circulation, the theoretical gold peso would be repre- 
sented by a silver peso, containing 416 grains of silver .900 fine, the 
same silver content as the Mexican dollar (Kernrnerer 1916, 314). 
The Philippine Gold Standard Act established the administrative 
machinery for the currency reform. The new currency system was, in 
fact, a gold exchange standard. The currency was backed not by a sup- 
ply of gold in the PhiIippine treasury but by a reserve fund called 
Gold Standard Fund, which functioned to maintain the gold value of 
the currency in transactions abroad. Domestically, the government issued 
paper money, called silver certificates, against whch silver pesos of an 
equal value would be held in reserve. In th s  gold exchange system, the 
silver coins were token coins, the value of whch was hgher than that 
of their silver content. The Gold Standard Fund was kept in two lo- 
cations. Part of it was managed by the Insular Treasury in Manila, and 
the other was deposited in New York banks (Kernmerer 1916, 319). 
The Philippine gold exchange system was supposed to function au- 
tomatically. Individuals in the Philippines who wanted to make pay- 
ments abroad could purchase from the Insular Treasury in Manila 
drafts on the Gold Standard Fund in New York for the payment in 
dollars in that place. The money whch they paid to the Treasury would 
then be withdrawn from P u p p i n e  circulation. In the opposite direc- 
tion, the depository of the Gold Standard Fund in New York could 
sell exchange on the Gold Standard Fund in Manila for the payment in 
pesos in that place, which would increase the money in citculation in 
the country. Over the years, the Gold Standard Fund had grown in size, 
covering 40 percent of the monetary circulation in the islands by 1908. 
In this policy process of establishmg a new currency in the Philippines, 
monetary theory and practical business interests were closely knit, as shown 
in the personal hstory of one of the key figures. Charles Conant was 
not only the leading advocate of U.S. imperialism and theoretician of 
the gold standard; he also had a personal interest in the outcome of the 
currency reforms. From 1902 to 1906, he was treasurer of the Morton 
Trust Company of New York, a bank owned by the House of Mor- 
gan, whch had a strong influence on American political circles at the 
time. The economic historian Rothbard (2002, 232-33) writes: 
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. . . it was surely no coincidence that Morton Trust was the bank 
that held the reserve funds for the governments of the Philippines, 
Panama, and the Dominican Republic, after their respective cur- 
rency reforms. 
When the new Phhppine currency was introduced in July 1903, it 
initially met unexpected resistance. For many months, Clunese merchants 
sull preferred the Mexican peso and accepted the new Phdtppine peso, 
which had a hgher fiduciary value than the Mexican dollar but the same 
bulhon content, only as an equivalent to the old. The old money, which 
was less valuable in terms of gold, had the same purchasing power as 
the new. The banks used the new coins to purchase drafts on the Gold 
Standard Fund and, with the foreign balances, purchased Mexican dol- 
lars for importation into the islands. In t h s  way, the new currency was 
returned to the treasury as quickly as it was brought into circulation. 
To change this situation, the American government in the Pupp ines  
enacted two laws. The first law, passed in October 1903, prohibited 
the importation into the islands of Mexican dollars or any other foreign 
currency. The second law, passed in January 1904, announced that from 
the end of that year, the use of old currency would be heavily taxed. 
These measures broke the resistance to the new currency. By 1905, the 
old currency had been practically eluntnated from circulation and the is- 
lands were firmly established upon the gold exchange standard. 
The new currency had hardly begun to circulate when new cllfficul- 
ties arose as a result of the rapid rise in the price of silver from April 
1905 to the second half of 1906 (see figure 6). The bullion value of 
the peso became higher than the money value of the coin. The gold 
value of the new peso was officially fixed at 50 U.S. dollar cents, but 
fluctuated in practice to around 49.5 cents. The bulhon par of the new 
PhAppine peso was reached when the price of silver in the London 
market was 299'4 pence per ounce of silver, and the exportation of 
pesos became profitable when the price for the delivery of silver in 
sixty days' time (the futures or forward market) would.reach 301/4 
pence. In 1906, the silver price went even above thls level. It  became 
profitable to export the pesos to Hong Kong and to melt them. 
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Source: Kemmerer 1916, 353-355. 
Figure 6. Exchange value and bulhon value of the new Philippine peso in U.S. dollar 
cents, between September 1904 and January 1908. 
It was also possible that the new pesos would be exported not as 
silver bullion but as money. In Hong I<ong, Shanghai, Tientsin, Pelung, 
and other Chinese cities, the circulating medium was composed of a 
great variety of coins; old and new Mexican dollars, old Hong I<ong 
dollars, new British dollars, and new Straits dollars readily passed cur- 
rent at different rates. These dollars all commanded a premium of 
about 3 to 4 percent in terms of sterling exchange. In Hong I<ong, 
the unit of account was the bank notes of the Hong Kong Bank, re- 
deemable in chopped dollars, that is, dollars stamped with a mark to 
certi5 their authenticity. Philippine pesos had the same silver content as 
these other coins, and could be easily absorbed in circulation along the 
Chinese coast. The total expense of shlpping coins from Manila to 
Hong Kong would be only about a fourth of 1 percent. As the pre- 
mium was more than 3 percent, the exporter would st111 make a profit. 
At one time, it would be more profitable to export Philippine currency 
as buhon, at another, as r n ~ n e y . ~  
It was estimated that between 0.5 and 1 million pesos were ex- 
ported, all of them probably going to China. The head office of the 
Hong I<ong Bank at Hong I<ong was reported to have held in its 
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vaults at  one time as much as 400,000 pesos (Icemrnerer 1916, 355). 
The government prohtbited the exportation of the coin or the bulhon 
obtained from melting them, with an Act adopted in early 1906. How- 
ever, it was difficult to control the borders, and there was constant 
danger that the coins would be smuggled out of the country. 
The government therefore decided in July 1906 to recoin the money 
into coins with a smaller fine silver content. As a protection against sil- 
ver price increases in the future, the government decided to drastically 
reduce the weight of the new coins to 308.64 grains and their silver 
content to 246.912 grains. Between late 1906 and 1908, coins of the 
first issue were withdrawn from circulation, recoined, and brought back 
into circulation. The silver coinage of the first issue was 32.7 d o n ,  
and, eventually, only 30 d o n  coins were withdrawn from circulation 
and recoined, leaving 2.7 d o n  unaccounted for (Kemrnerer 1916). 
These coins had probably been smuggled out of the country to be 
melted into silver. Apparently, the American colonial government was 
not yet able to fully control cross-border traffic. 
Conclusion 
In the late 1930s, the Fhpino banker and economist Miguel Cuaderno 
passed hts judgment on the Phhppine currency system. At the time, the 
country had experienced years of economic hardshtp as a result of the 
depression, the Americans had transferred part of their sovereignty to 
the Philippine government of President Quezon, and the expectation 
was that full independence would be acquired w i h  a few years. The 
country's political leaders and newspaper writers hotly debated the de- 
sirabhty of a fundamental change in the currency system. Cuaderno, 
who had acquired a reputation as an economic nationalist and who 
would put his ideas of monetary independence into practice after the 
Pacific War, when he became the first governor of the newly estab- 
lished Phhppine Central Bank (1949), made the following statement: 
Taken by and large, the experience of the Philippines with its 
present currency system, during a period of over thirty years, has 
been quite satisfactory; indeed it has stood the test of time better 
than the systems in many of the principal countries, not excepting 
the United States. With the principal countries of the world still 
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grappling with huge problems of currency stabhation, . . . it would 
seem untimely and illogical to discard a monetary system which has 
served the country comparatively well. (Cuaderno 1937) 
"Comparatively well": a positive but somewhat reserved judgment. 
The question thrusts itself upon us: Why has the American colonial 
administration in the Philippines been able to successfully carry out a 
currency reform, where the Spaniards had failed in the early 1890s? 
Various factors could have played a role, but an important difference 
was that the American government had at its disposal a number of 
well-informed economists eager to play the role of policy advisers, 
whereas Spain had not been able to mobiltze this level of theoretical 
and practical knowledge. The most prominent among the American 
advisers was Charles Conant, who designed the plan for the new cur- 
rency system. Conant and his colleagues had studied currency reforms 
in other countries, particularly the monetary experiment in India, which 
they considered as unsuccessful, and the successful reform in Japan. 
They conceived of the new type of monetary system, the gold ex- 
change standard, as "a system founded from the outset on scientific 
principles and sustained by the whole moral power of the Govern- 
ment of the United States" (Conant 1901, 28). Conant's student, the 
economist Edwin Kemmerer, who supervised the introduction of the 
new system in the islands, served for more than thirty years as adviser 
to the American government, and spread the Philippine monetary 
model to other countries in the world. 
Conant proceeded cautiously in designing the new system. He re- 
jected the idea of introducing the U.S. dollar as legal tender in the is- 
lands to humor local sensitivities. He designed the new Phtlippine peso 
in such a way that the silver content of this gold-based coin would be 
s d a r  to that of the old Mexican dollar to make it acceptable to the 
people. He modeled the larger financial architecture, with the provision 
of a currency reserve fund to maintain international parity, after sudar  
systems elsewhere. And, in the end, the American admrtllstration used its 
political power, proclaiming the new currency as legal tender and driv- 
ing out the old coins. 
The shift from foreign commodity money into a territorial currency 
in the Phhppines was part of a more general process of colonial state 
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formation. A territorial currency enables the government to better 
control the money supply, to intervene in the domestic economy, and 
to provide for the fiscal needs of the state. The gold exchange standard 
increased the flexibility of the money supply, as paper money could be 
substituted for metallic coins. However, the system did have serious 
drawbacks, as had been manifested in the course of time. Money cir- 
culation was closely tied to the balance of payments, and there was 
little space for the creation of credit to stimulate economic develop- 
ment. These problems were felt strongly in the following decades, and 
were openly discussed in the late 1930s. Addressing these problems 
became the chief concern of  Philippine economists after the Pacific 
War. It  required the brdhant minds of M.tgue1 Cuaderno and his col- 
leagues, theoretically and practically knowledgeable and internationally 
well connected, to design a new monetary system. The creation of the 
financial architecture of the 1949 Phdtppine Central Bank, with its man- 
aged currency system and pragmatic monetary policy, stimulating 
economic development throughout the 1950s, was an intellectual and 
political feat comparable to and at least equal to the achievements of 
the 1903 reformers. 
Notes 
This article is based on archival and library research in the National Archives and 
the Library of Congress of the United States in August 1996 (funded by the In- 
ternational Institute for Asian Studtes); in the American Historical Collection at the 
Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City, Phhppines; the National Archives, 
Mada, Philippines; and the Historical National Archive in Madrid, Spain (funded 
by the Faculty of Social Sciences, Nijmegen University, The Netherlands). I ac- 
knowledge Dr. Benito Legarda, Dr. Gerard Persoon, and an anonymous reader 
for comments on an earlier version of this paper; as well as an anonymous re- 
viewer of this journal for a number of useful comments. I owe special thanks to 
Ingrid Diaz for helping me with the search for, and collection of, research materi- 
als in 1996, 1997,2001, and 2002; and my colleague H. F. M E Hoekstra, curator of 
the Nijmegen Anthropological Museum, for allowing me use of his photographs. 
1. These figures were compiled by the Chief of the Division of the Currency, 
the American economist E. W Kemmerer, from the daily records of the Mada 
branch of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (Kernrnerer 1905, 23). 
2. Wrt 1900, 148, US National Archives, War Department, Bureau of Insular 
Affairs, Record Group 350, File 808-373:s. 
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3. US National Archives (24 October 1900), War Department, Bureau of Insu- 
lar Affairs, Record Group 350, File 808-456-7. 
4. Memorandum (27 February 1912), US National Archives, War Department, 
Bureau of Insular Affairs, Record Group 350, File 808-373:16. 
5. Memorandum (27 February 1912), US National Archives, War Department, 
Bureau of Insular Affairs, Record Group 350, File 808-373:14a. 
6. Memorandum (27 February 1912), US National Archives, War Department, 
Bureau of Insular Affairs, Record Group 350, File 808-373:4849, quoting from 
the Report made by the Secretary of Waq November 1904, House Document N a  2. 
7. Statement on the Phihppine Currency by A. M. Townsend, submitted to 
the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Philippines of the US Senate on 
13 February 1902, US National Archives, War Department, Bureau of Insular 
Affairs, Record Group 350, File 808-53. 
8. Kemmerer, E. W, Memorandum concerning the effects on the Philippine 
currency system of a rise in the price of silver above the bullion par of the peso 
(1 1 November 1905), US National Archives, War Department, Bureau of Insular 
Affairs, Record Group 350, File 808-290. 
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